Foreign investment and productivity growth in Czech enterprises by Djankov, Simeon & Hoekman, Bernard
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2115
Foreign Investment and  Foreign  direct investrnent  had
a greater positive impact on
Productivity Growth in  total factor  productivity  in
Czech Enterprises  firms  in the Czech  Republic
over  a four-year  period  than
joint ventures did, suggesting
Simeon Djankov  that parent firms transferred
Bernard Hoekman  more know-how to affiliates
than  joint venture firms got
from their partners.  Firms
without  foreign partners
experienced  negative spillover
effects,  possibly because
rewer training efforts made
them less  able to absorb and
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Summary findinigs
Firm-lcvel data for the Czech Republic (1992-96)  industry, the magnitude of the negative effect becomes
suggest that foreign investment had a positive ilmpact on  much smaller and loses statistical significance.
recipient firms' total factor productivity (TFP) growth,  Thlis  result, together with the fact that joint ventures
This result is robust to corrections for the sample-  and foreign direct investment together account for
selection bias that orevails because foreign investment  significant shares of total output in many industries,
tends to go to firms with above-average productivity  suggests  that more research is needed to determine how
perfornmance.  much knowledge diffuses frorn firms with strong links to
This result is not surprising, given the presumption  foreign firms to firms that do no,  have such links.
that foreign investors transfer new technologies and  Especially  important  is the extent  of spillovers amnong
knowiedge to partner  fir;ns. With some lag, this is likely  joint venture firms and benteen  foreign affiliates and
to be reflected in greater TFP growth.  firms with joint ventures.
Foreign direct investment appears to have a greater  Insofar as joint venture firms invest more in
impact on TFP growth than joint ventures, suggesting  technological capacity (as suggested by their training
that parent firms are transferring more know-how (soft  efforts), those firms could be expected to be better able
or hard) to affiliates than joint venture firms get from  to absorb and benefit from the diffusion of know-how.
their partners.  The absence of such capacity nmay  underlie the observed
Joint ventures and foreign direct investment together  negative spillover effect on other firms in the industry.
appear to have a negative spillover effect on firms that  Longer time series and  collection of data on variables
do not have foreign partnerships.  This effect is relatively  that measure firms' in-house technological effort would
large and statistically significant. But if the focus is  help identify the magnitude and determinants of
restricted to the impact of foreign-owned affiliates  technological spillovers.
(foreign direct investrment)  on all other firms in an
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I.  Introduction
There is a rich case study literature documenting how new technologies and know-how is
adopted by firms and industries. It points to the vital role of imports and openness to trade, both
for learning through re-engineering and direct inputs into production, and through
communications with and information from foreign partners (suppliers and buyers). Using
aggregate data, a number of recent studies have concluded that  trading with countries that are
relatively R&D-intensive leads to higher productivity growth of domestic industry (Coe and
Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister, 1997). While these findings are not inconsistent
with the endogenous growth literature, they do not reveal much about how technology transfer
occurs.
The micro-economic literature has emphasized three channels for the international
transmission of technology: imports of new capital and differentiated intermediate goods
(Feenstra, Markusen and Zeile, 1996; Grossman and Helpman, 1995); learning by exporting
(Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998), and foreign investment (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997).
Particular attention has centered on the role of foreign investment as a channel of knowledge
transfer and on the spillovers of know-how to other firms in the economy.  Foreign investment
should be associated with the transfer of knowledge since by definition it is driven by the
existence of intangible assets owned by the parent firm (Markusen, 1995). The conventional
wisdom is that foreign investment is a major channel of technology transfer to developing
countries. Pack and Saggi (1997) note that intrafirm transactions in royalties and license fees
between parent firms and subsidiaries account for over 80 percent of total global flows.
1What matters for economic growth are the spillovers to other firms withiin  and across
industries. Evidence on this is much less robust. The case study literature has argued that positive
spillovers are significant. It has also documented the importance of the availability in local skills
and in-house technological capacity in adapting and using techniques developed elsewhere (Lall,
1992; Evenson and Westphal, 1995). Conversely, recent micro-econometric studies using panel
datasets of enterprises have come to more ambiguous conclusions. Some analysts have found a
statistically significant negative relationship between the size of foreign investment in an
industry or economy and the productivity performance of domestic firms (e.g., Harrison, 1996;
Haddad and Harrison, 1993).
This paper investigates the impact of foreign investment on productivity performance of
firms in the Czech Republic during the initial post-reform period (1992-96).i  We distinguish
between firms that established partnerships with foreign firms-either  through a joint venture or
through direct sale of a majority equity stake-and  those that did not, and ask whether total
factor productivity (TFP) growth rates of these groups of firms differ. TFP is used as an indirect
measure of technology transfer. Data constraints prohibit using more direct measures, such as
R&D effort or the turnover of managers and highly skilled labor. Our results suggest that TFP
growth is higher in firms with foreign partnerships, and that there is a clear hierarchy: firms that
have been acquired by foreign owners have the highest TFP growth, followed by firms with joint
ventures. Firms without foreign partnerships have the lowest TFP growth as a group. This result
'  A separate but related literature  on technology  diffusion  has focused largely on two issues: (i) analysis of the
determinants  of the number  of firms or the proportion  of industry  output produced  by a new technology  (aggregate
diffusion);  and (ii) analysis  of the determinants  of the time  at which  a firm adopts  a new technology  relative  to other
firms (so-called duration  models) (See e.g., Ray, 1964;  Karshenas  and Stoneman,  1994). Data constraints  prohibit
analysis of the types of questions asked in the diffusion literature as it is not possible to  identify specific
technologies  in our data set.
2continues to obtain if an adjustment is made for the higher initial level of productivity observed
in firms that attract foreign participation.
We find a statistically significant negative spillover effect of foreign participation in an
industry-through  joint ventures and FDI-on  firms without such links. This finding is
consistent with the results found by Aitken and Harrison (1996) for Colombia and Haddad and
Harrison (1993) for Morocco. It suggests that although foreign ownership and/or collaboration
has a beneficial impact on the performance of the domestic partner entities, this has not spilled
over to the rest of the industry in the time period studied. In part this result may simply reflect
the fact that in a transition economy like the Czech Republic, the amount of time required to
independently adapt and learn to apply more efficient techniques takes more time than is spanned
by the four-year period for which we have data. The result should also be interpreted in light of
the fact that on average firms with foreign partnerships account for almost 50 percent of total
assets and more than 40 percent of total employment in our sample. If the analysis of spillovers
is restricted to the impact of FDI (foreign majority ownership) on the rest of the industry, the
spillover effect remains negative, but becomes much smaller and is no longer significant. This is
likely to reflect not only the fact that joint venture firms have higher TFP growth than firms
without any foreign partnerships, but may also indicate that know-how spillovers from FDI
require a minimum level of technological capacity and effort to be absorbed. Survey data on
training and investment in technologies suggests many domestic firms may have relatively weak
capacities in this regard compared to firms with joint ventures. This illustrates the importance of
taking into account differences in the characteristics of firms in each industry, in particular their
3endowment  of technological  abilities  and investments  in upgrading  that ability (as proxied e.g.,
by the level of R&D spending).
The paper is organized  as follows.  Section  II briefly  reviews  the relevant  literature  on
channels  of technology  transfer  and spillovers. Section  III describes  the data set. Section  IV lays
out the estimation  approach.  Section  V presents  the results  of the empirical  analysis. Section  VI
concludes.
II.  Channels  of Technology  Transfer
While  there is little doubt  that technologies  make their way across  international  boundaries,  the
mechanisms  through  which  this occurs  are not well understood.  Aside from case  studies,  most of
the empirical  evidence  is based  on aggregate  data or cross sectional  surveys,  and is subject  to
multiple  interpretations.  Various  transmission  channels  may  play a role in the technology  transfer
process. New technologies  may be embodied  in goods  and transferred  through  imports  of new
varieties  of differentiated  products  or capital  goods and equipment,  or through  anus-length  trade
in intellectual  property, e.g., licensing  contracts.  Firms may learn about  technologies  by
exporting  to knowledgeable  buyers,  who share  product  designs  and production  techniques  with
them. Technology  transfer  will also occur  in the context  of formal  cooperative  arrangements
between foreign  and local firms, e.g., FDI (acquisition)  or project-specific  joint ventures. 2 In all
these cases  technology  acquisition  will require  the availability  of workers  with appropriate
training  and expertise  to allow  technology  absorption  and adaptation.  The absence  of such a
2  See e.g., Helleiner  (1973) and Keesing  and Lall (1992) on sub-contracting;  Feenstra et al. (1992) on imports of
inputs;  Blomstrom  and Kokko  (1997) for a recent survey  of the literature  on FDI; and Pack and Saggi (1997) for a
general survey  of the literature  on technology  transfer.
4capacity is often held to explain why TFP is frequently lower in developing countries firms than
in industrialized nations even if identical equipment is utilized (Pack, 1987).
It is helpful to differentiate between technology transfers that are realized in the context
of formal cooperative arrangements between a foreign and a domestic firm and those that occur
at "arms-length." The latter, which include arms-length trade in machinery and components and
direct purchases of knowledge (payment for patents, blueprints, etc.) can be a major avenue of
technology transfer. However, not all technologies are available at arms-length.  Many may only
be obtainable through formal cooperation--either majority ownership (acquisition) or project-
specific joint ventures. 3 In theory, firms will be adverse to unbundling and selling know-how or
products if there are important internalization incentives-FDI  may then be the preferred route to
exploit knowledge advantages (Markusen, 1995; 1998).
Foreign investment is likely to be associated with transfer of both hard (machinery,
blueprints) and soft (management, information) technologies. It will have two dimensions:
"generic" know-how such as management skills, quality systems, etc.; and specific know-how
that cannot be obtained at arms-length because of weaknesses in the existing policy environment
(e.g., enforcement of intellectual property rights) 4 or because of internalization incentives. As
regards the former, foreign partners may reduce the cost of upgrading and learning by assisting in
the identification and implementation of systems to ensure that production meets technical
specifications, is delivered on time, etc. Interviews with managers of enterprises with foreign
3  Notions of arms-length  exchange  used in the literature  vary.  For example, Pack and Saggi (1997) make a
distinction  between intrafirm  exchange  (FDI) and contractual  exchanges  (licensing,  joint ventures, turn key
projects,  etc.). They call  the latter  arms-length  arrangements.
4  See Smarzynska  (1998) for a recent  analysis  of the relationship  between  intellectual  property  protection  and
FDI in transition  economies.
5partnerships by the authors suggest that all of these dimensions are prevalent in the Czech
Republic. But more important is presumably the access to unique parent-firm-specific
information, as well as production and distribution networks.
A question is whether and to what extent the knowledge "transferred" by multinationals
to affiliates diffuses to other firms in the industry. 5 Theoretical models of foreign investment
suggest there should be a positive relationship between FDI and diffusion. Know-how will
diffuse from firm to firm through demonstration effects, labor turnover, or reverse engineering.
Das (1987) models a foreign subsidiary as a price leader, and domestic fimns as a competitive
fringe. If learning by domestic firms is proportional to the output of the multinational firm-i.e.,
the larger the multinational is relative to the domestic industry, the easier the learning-this
creates incentives to transfer technology to its subsidiary as profits are higher if more advanced
technology is used. The greater output of the subsidiary then induces native firms learn and adopt
the foreign technology at a higher rate. Wang and Blomstrkm (1992) use a similar setup, but
endogenize both the level of technology transfer from the parent company to the subsidiary and
the investment in learning activities by the domestic firm.  Foreign firms again transfer
technology at a higher rate if domestic firms invest more in the learning activities.  Some
empirical support for this prediction is found by Blomstrom, Kokko and Zejan (1994).
The empirical evidence on spillovers from foreign-owned affiliates to indigenous firms is
mixed (Blomstr6m and Kokko, 1997). There is an extensive case study literature that seeks to
determine whether and how large spillovers from R&D are. Much of this focuses on
5  Equally  important  may be spillovers  across  industries.  This is an issue  that is not explored  in this paper,
although  it may be important  in the transition  context.
6industrialized  countries. 6 The literature  on developing  countries  has documented  that the
magnitude  of potential  knowledge  spillovers  depends  importantly  on the existence  of
technological  capabilities  allowing  the assimilation  of know-how  by indigenous  firms (Pack  and
Westphal,  1995).  A unique  feature  of many transition  economies  in comparison  to most
developing  countries  is that technological  ability  is substantially  greater.  In principle,  this should
facilitate  adoption  of new technologies  and allow  rapid convergence  towards "best practice."
Much of the econometric  literature  has focused  on productivity  measures  as a proxy
measure  of technology  diffusion.  Early studies  such as Blomstr6m  and Persson  (1983),  using
industry  level data, found that domestic  labor  productivity  is positively  influenced  by foreign
presence  in an industry,  measured  by the foreign  share  of industry  employment.  More recent
studies using firm level data are less supportive  of the existence  of spillovers.  Aitken  and
Harrison  (1997)  and Haddad  and Harrison  (1993)  find that foreign  investment  has a negative
effect on the performance  of domestically  owned  firms.  Harrison  (1996)  suggests  that in
imperfectly  competitive  markets  entry by foreign  investors  implies  that domestic  incumbents
lose market share  and this impedes  their ability to attain scale economies.  The negative  spillover
results contrast  with the findings  of the case study-based  literature  and may to some  extent  reflect
the omission  of important  variables  such as the level of R&D spending,  expenditures  on training
and the magnitude  of employment  of personnel  with technical  degrees  (engineers,  scientists). 7
6  See Griliches (1992)  for a survey of the literature on R&D spillovers, Nelson and Wolff (1997) for a recent
contribution to this literature.
7  The literature on technology acquisition and adoption in developing countries is substantial. See, for example,
Evenson and Westphal (1987), Lall (1987; 1992), and Pack and Westphal (1986). Westphal, Rhee and Pursell
(1981) discuss the case of Korea in some depth..
7The analysis  in this paper relies on the estimation  of production  functions  and the use of
TFP as a proxy measure  for technology  transfer.  Our reliance  on TFP as the dependent  variable
assumes  that the adoption  of new technologies  will, with some lag, lead to an improvement  in
productivity.  A serious  problem with this assumption  is that  the case  study literature  has
documented  that such productivity  improvements  are dependent  on the technological  abilities of
domestic  firms.  Nelson  and Pack (1998)  have  demonstrated  that the production  function
methodology  can underestimate  or ignore  the role of technological  effort  at the level of the firm,
and thus affect  TFP growth  estimates.  Differences  in technological  capacity  across  firms  in an
industry  may be an important  determinant  of TFP performance,  but we do not have information
on this at the level of the firm-data  on technology-relevant  variables  such as R&D expenditure
or the composition  of the workforce  are not available  at the level of the firrr..  However,  the Czech
Republic  is not a developing  country-it  has a long-standing  industrial  base and is well-endowed
with engineering  and scientific  human  capital.  For the economy  as whole,  therefore,  the capacity
to rapidly upgrade  productive  efficiency  through  the adoption  of best practice  techniques  (both
hard and soft) should  be considerable.  Note that this makes  the Czech case  less relevant  as a
comparator  for developing  countries  that do not have equivalent  endowments.
III.  Profile  of Czech  Firms
Information  on Czech  enterprises  was compiled  for the 1992-97  period  from surveys  using a
questionnaire  prepared  by the authors and a database  containing  financial  and ownership
information.  Financial  variables  were defined  using international  accounting  standards  from the
onset of the survey  in 1992. The database  comprises  513 firms  quoted  on the Prague  stock
8exchange whose shares traded at least four times in a given year and report the financial
information required. Of the sample firms, 340 did not establish joint ventures or attract FDI; 91
concluded joint ventures with foreign companies and 82 attracted majority foreign equity
investment. Thus, 34 percent of the sample (173 firms) had a foreign link-either  a joint venture
or FDI, with relatively uniform distribution across sectors (Table 1).
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Sector  Total  Sample  No Foreign  Partner  Foreign  Partner
(FDI  or J.V.)
Mining  11  8  3
Construction  82  55  27
Food  and  beverage  54  36  18
Textiles  and Apparel  39  28  11
Furniture  and  Other  Wood  Products  11  5  6
Pulp  and paper  14  10  4
Printing  and Publishing  13  6  7
Chemicals  30  18  12
Shoes  and Leather  Products  6  5  1
Non-Metallic  Mineral  Products  21  16  5
Basic  Metals  13  9  4
Fabricated  Metal  Products  24  12  12
Electric  and Electronics  82  54  28
Transport  Equipment  12  5  7
Other  Manufacturing  10  6  4
Retail  Services  15  11  4
Financial  services  76  56  20
Number  of Observations  513  340  173
Share  in Total  100.0%  66.3%  33.7%
The criterion used in our sample to determine the existence of a foreign partnership or
ownership relationship is that at least 20 percent of the equity is owned by a single foreign entity
or that the firn  has established one or more joint ventures with a foreign partner. Because
minority shareholders have little protection under Czech law, equity investors have an incentive
to take a majority  stake. Most firms with foreign equity ownership in the sample are majority
foreign owned. While the share of firms with foreign linkages appears to be high, it is
representative of Czech industry more generally. Aggregate statistics using a 5 percent or more
9foreign equity ownership share as a criterion reveal that during 1994-97, 42 percent of all
manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees were involved in some kind of foreign
partnership (Czech Statistical Office, 1998).
Firms  with  foreign partnerships tend to  be significantly  larger than firms that  remain
independent: the median  level of  total  employment in FDI  firns  is  689, in  firms with joint
ventures the median number of employees is 578, as compared to 352 employees in the median
firm without foreign links.  Foreign affiliates or joint ventures also have higher levels of initial
labor productivity, measured as sales per worker in  1991 (Figure 1). This suggests that foreign
investors are attracted to firrns with above average performnance  and size.
Figure 1:  Labor Productivity, 1991 (in 1,000 CK)
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Average TFP growth perfornance  of firms with FDI is also highest of the three groups,
followed  by  firms  with  joint  ventures and  domestic  enterprises  (Figure  2).  This  may  be  a
reflection of the better than average initial level of productivity perfornance,  suggesting foreign
investors choose the "best" firms as partners. In the statistical analysis we therefore correct for
10the possibility of selection bias. The magnitude of TFP growth rates is highest in earlier years
and tapers off towards the end of the sample period.  This  reflects a marked deterioration in
macroeconomic conditions in  1996, a common effect for all firms. TFP growth rates initially
diverge substantially, with firms with foreign investment increasing growth, while other firms
experience a reduction in TFP growth rates. Thereafter some convergence occurs, suggesting that
there may be spillover effects occurring towards the end of the period.
Figure 2:  Total Factor Productivity Growth
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Questionnaires suggest that both joint ventures and FDI are associated with technology
transfers.  Figure 3 presents the results of a questionnaire sent to the firms in the sample in early
1997.  Two questions related to  training and  acquisition of new technologies were  included.
Managerial responses clearly reveal what appears to be a significant difference between  firms
with  and without foreign partnerships. The first question asked managers "Have your workers
undergone any training in the last two years?". Managers were given discrete choices "Yes/No."
In firms without foreign partners only  18 percent replied in the affirmative, while 47 and  60
percent  of managers whose firms were involved in either joint  ventures or FDI, respectively,
11answered positively. The  second  question  asked  whether new  technology (machinery,
equipment) or  related know-how had been obtained in  the  previous two  years. Foreign
investment was again associated with substantially greater positive responses-in  over 70
percent of the FDI cases and 50 percent of the joint ventures,  the partner acquired  some kind of
new technology, as opposed to  35 percent for firms without foreign linkages. Note that the
relative difference  between the two sets of firms on the training variable ("software")  is greater
than on the technology  ("hardware")  variable. These figures illustrate  that although  we do not
have firm-level data on technological  effort, foreign partnerships are associated  with greater
investments  in training  and knowledge  acquisition.
Figure 3: Training and New Technology
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IV.  Estimation Procedure
We estimate production functions for the firms included in the sample. Each firm i has a
production  function  for gross output:
(1)  Y; = FI(Li,  Mi,  K,  T;)
12where Y  is gross output, K, L and M are inputs of capital, labor, and materials, and T indexes
technology. The firm's production  function  F is homogeneous  of degree  g (g:J)  in K, L, and M
Firms are assumed to be price takers on factor markets,  but may have market power in output
markets. The former  assumption  is reasonable  since  wages were largely set centrally  during  the
sample  period, and most materials  were bought abroad  at world-market  prices.
The production  function in (1) implies the following  relation  between marginal physical
products  and outputs: 8
(2)  FLJL + F M; +FK'  K  = gYt
where FJ is the marginal product of input  J. The optimal  choice of inputs by a firm with some
monopoly  power implies:
(3)  PiFj =  >jPn
where Pji is the price of factor J, Pi is the price of the firm's output, and ,u, is the markup of
price over marginal cost: A, =  PJlMC,, where  MCi is marginal cost. Combining  (2) and (3) we
obtain
(4)  s,i +  SM;  +  SKC  =  gi l S1
where s;  = Pji Ji / Pi  Yi  are the expenditures  on each factor Ji  relative to total enterprise
revenues.  Since  firms do not necessarily  produce  under  constant  returns  to scale, the sum of these
shares  is not always unity. The revenue  share  of capital  can be defined  as:
(5)  K=  1  - SM;  =  SKi+  (1-  g / ,uj), (using  equation  4).
8  We are grateful  to a referee  for suggesting  the specific  fornulation used below.
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The productivity equation can then be derived from equations (1) as
(6)  dy; = He[PsLidl, + sK,dk, + SMddmiI  +  UJ  [SK,  - SK,]dki  + FT  dt,
F'
where dy, is output growth and  F'  dt,  measures the technology change or TFP growth. The
F'
second term on the right hand  side can be  simplified to  (g; - jti)dk 1 using  (5). Equation  (6) is
estimated in log-differences, using actual enterprise-level data to construct the first right-hand
side term. There are two terms to estimate for each industry (gi and gt, the scale and markup
parameters), as well as the TFP parameter for each enterprise. We use the reported book value of
fixed assets to construct the capital revenue share.
To  take  into account the likelihood that foreign investment choices  are not  randomly
distributed-the  descriptive statistics reported in Table  1 suggest that the firms attracting FDI
and  joint  ventures  have  above  average  initial  performance-we  correct  for  the  possible
endogeneity of foreign investment choices by using the generalized Heckman two-step procedure
for correcting sample selection bias  as developed by Amemiya (1984). This involves separate
estimation  of  the  foreign investment  decision  and  the  subsequent  firm productivity  growth
performance.  The  first  step  uses  a  probit  model  to  determine  the  probability  of  foreign
investment based on initial efficiency (proxied by the share of variable costs in total revenues),
firm size, and type of industry. The second step involves an estimation, using only observations
on firms with  foreign linkages. This results  in an omitted variable sample selection bias.  The
Amemiya procedure provides for a specification of the omitted variable that can be used in the
full sample to  alleviate sample selection.  An additional variable estimated in the first  step is
included in the second-step regression.
14Since the primary  focus  of this paper is  to test  the association  between productivity
growth and foreign investment, we augment equation (6) by including a dummy for firms with
foreign partners as an additional "factor of production." The dummy (FOREIGN) is 1 if a firm
had a either FDI or a joint venture in the preceding year, 0 otherwise. This approach is similar to
the empirical  design used in Harrison (1994). In addition, the effects of other changes in the
economic environment have to be controlled for. We do not have good proxies for these changes,
nor can we account individually for each of them. Instead, we include annual dummies in the
estimating equation which pick up the net effects of changes in the economic environment at the
aggregate level.
We are also interested in investigating whether there have been any spillover effects from
foreign investment on other firms which operate in the same sectors but do not have foreign
partners. To analyze this, we run equation (6) on local firms only, and include as an additional
independent variable (SPILLOVER) the share of assets of firms with FDI or joint  ventures in
total assets of all firms in each sector. If foreign participation has beneficial spillover effects on
other firms, we would expect the coefficient to be positive.
Because of the probable correlation between productivity effects and the independent
variables, ordinary least squares (OLS) may give biased and inconsistent estimates. This
simultaneity problem is endemic to the empirical literature on productivity measurement. We
address the issue by using F-tests to reveal whether OLS is appropriate, and relying on the
Hausman specification test to choose between random or fixed effects frameworks in cases
where OLS should not be used. These tests suggest that a random effects model is most
15appropriate. 9 Coefficient estimates for the major coefficients or variables of interest are reported
in Table 2, as well as information on the share of assets of firms with either joint ventures of FDI
in total assets (48%) and the share of firms with majority foreign ownership (19%).
Table 2: Revenue Shares of Inputs, Mark-up and Scale Estimates
Share  of
Sector  Sm  S,  Sk  |i  Foreign  Share of FDI
Assets  Assets
Mining  0.538  0.215  0.246  1.246  1.200  0.398  0.124
Construction  0.720  0.169  0.111  1.137  1.088  0.432  0.325
Food and beverage  0.629  0.206  0.165  1.388  1.264  0.635  0.311
Textiles and Apparel  0.677  0.180  0.142  1.284  1.132  0.294  0.182
Furniture and Other Wood Products  0.743  0.145  0.110  1.152  1.001  0.542  0.261
Pulp and paper  0.791  0.129  0.079  1.211  1.113  0.715  0.521
Printing  and Publishing  0.730  0.136  0.133  0.889  0.992  0.885  0.605
Chemicals  0.757  0.151  0.091  1.201  1.163  0.547  0.281
Shoes and Leather Products  0.612  0.224  0.162  1.182  1.119  0.128  0.000
Non-Metallic  Mineral Products  0.615  0.191  0.193  0.958  0.996  0.408  0.241
Basic Metals  0.702  0.155  0.142  1.211  0.880  0.367  0.134
Fabrcated  Metal Products  0.733  0.121  0.145  1.192  1.100  0.785  0.191
Electric  and Electronics  0.657  0.191  0.151  1.201  1.039  0.356  0.110
Transport Equipment  0.687  0.117  0.195  1.272  1.070  0.428  0.127
Other Manufacturing  0.594  0.171  0.233  n.a.  n.a.  0.524  0.229
Retail  Services  0.257  0.453  0.289  1.352  1.198  0.402  0.221
Financial Services  0.190  0.609  0.200  1.079  1.324  0.368  0.141
Average  0.625  0.209  0.164  1.184  1.104  0.483  0.191
V.  Results
The results  of  estimating equation  6 are reported in  Table  3, using  both  OLS  and a
random effects specification. The estimated coefficient on the dummy for FDI is positive  and
statistically significant for both specifications. This suggests that as predicted foreign investment
involves an additional "transfer of technology". The dummy for joint ventures also has a positive
sign, but is slightly smaller in magnitude and is not statistically significant.
9  A fixed- effects estimation assumes firm productivity growth to be constant over time. This assumption is
objectionable since changes in productivity due to increased competition is the phenomenon we seek to
explore.  The random-effects model avoids the imposition of constant productivity growth over time, but has
the drawback that productivity shocks at the firm level are assumed to be uncorrelated over time. This may not
be a reasonable restriction if there is convergence or divergence in corporate performance.
16Table 3:  Panel Regression Estimates  (Full Sample)
Dependent  varable: Growth  in Sales  OLS  Random-Effects
Amemiya  Selection  Bias  Correction  Variable  Yes  Yes
Sector-Specific  Returns  to Scale  and Mark-ups  Yes  Yes
FDI Dummy  0.015*  0.015*
(2.011)  (1.937)
JV Dummy  0.011  0.010
(1.372)  (1.286)
Dummy  for 1994  -0.012*  -0.011
(-1.873)  (-1.672)
Dummy  for 1995  -0.052**  -0.052**
(-7.034)  (-6.942)
Dummy  for 1996  -0.054**  -0.053-
(-7.062)  (-7.534)
No. of observations  513  513
F-test  (A, B = Al, B)  0.89
Hausman  test  (random  vs. fixed  effects),'  25.66  (30.19)
Adjusted  R 2 0.894  0.861
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity  consistent  (White  correction);  t-statistics  in parentheses;
a constant  term  is included  in both regressions.  a Cut-off  point  in parentheses;
* Significant  at the 90%  level; ** Significant  at the 95%  level.
The possibility  of a  positive  spillover impact of  foreign investment is  considered by
including the share in total assets of firms with foreign partners (lagged one year) as a separate
regressor. This is a continuous, not  a categorical variable. As noted previously, this  approach
assumes  that  spillovers  are  sector-specific,  and  therefore  ignores  possible  inter-industry
spillovers. Table 4 reports the results of considering both joint  ventures and FDI,  i.e., foreign
investment broadly defined. Contrary to what is predicted, spillovers are negative: greater foreign
participation in an industry has a statistically significant negative effect on the performance of
other firms. Each  10 percent increase in the foreign asset share is associated with a  1.7 percent
fall in sales growth of domestic firms.
17Table 4: Spillover Effects  (Firms Without Foreign Linkages)
Dependent  variable:  Growth  in Sales
OLS  Random-Effects
Amemiya  Selection  Bias  Correction  Variable  Yes  Yes
Sector-Specific  Returns  to Scale  and  Mark-ups  Yes  Yes
Spillovers  (Share  of  assets  of  firms  with  joint  -0.178**  -0.172-
ventures  and  FDI)  (3.125)  (2.054)
Dummy  for 1994  0.002  0.002
(0.215)  (0.178)
Dummy  for 1995  -0.038**  -0.037*
(-4.201)  (-3.934)
Dummy  for  1996  -0.036**  -0.035**
(-3.534)  (-3.642)
Observations  340  340
F-test  0.92
Hausman  test  (random  vs.  fixed  effects)  4.57  (14.45)
Adjusted  R2  0.887  0.843
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity  consistent  (White  correction);  t-statistics  in parentheses;  a constant  tenn  is
included  in both  regressions;  ** Significant  at the 95% level.
It has been argued that spillovers from joint  ventures should be higher than those from
FDI (establishment of majority-owned affiliates) as the foreign partner has less ability to control
the behavior of the domestic partner, and the latter has a greater incentive to pursue R&D itself
(see, e.g., Pack and  Saggi,  1997). Internalization through FDI in  contrast should offer greater
opportunities to limit "technology leakage." If this is indeed the case, it implies that excluding
joint ventures from the SPILLOVER measure of foreign "ownership" share and re-estimating the
equation should increase the magnitude of the negative spillovers. The evidence, however, does
not  support this  argument  (Table  5). Instead, the magnitude  of the  spillover effect  becomes
smaller  and  statistically insignificant,  although  it remains  negative in  sign  (Table  6).  Thus,
excluding joint ventures has an offsetting effect. In part this reflects the fact that joint  venture
firms have higher TFP growth than firms without any foreign partnerships, and this  raises the
average  of the non-FDI  group.  This  result  illustrates  that the  initial negative  spillover  result  may
not be robust and that tests for spillovers with the methodology used here (and in the literature
18more generally) require some assurance that in distinguishing between two subsets of finns in an
industry on the basis of whether or not there is majority foreign ownership (or more generally
foreign  linkages  of  some  kind)  one  is  not  ignoring  other  important  determinants  of  the
performance of firms.
Table  5: Testing  for Spillover  Effects
(Firms  without  FDI)
Dependent  variable:  Growth  in Sales  OLS  Random-Effects
Amemiya  Selection  Bias  Correction  Variable  Yes  Yes
Sector-Specific  Returns  to Scale  and Mark-ups  Yes  Yes
Spillovers (Share  of assets  of foreign  affiliates  in  -0.077  -0.074
total assets  of the sector)  (1.425)  (1.218)
Dummy  for 1994  0.003  0.002
(0.897)  (0.178)
Dummy  for 1995  -0.032**  -0.031  **
(-2.985)  (-2.257)
Dummy  for 1996  -0.027*  -0.025
(-1.847)  (-1.514)
Observations  431  431
F-test  0.91
;Hlausman  test  (random  vs. fixed  effects)  a  4.13 (14.45)
Adjusted  R2  0.894  0.857
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity  consistent  (White  correction);  t-statistics in  parentheses;  a constant  term is
included  in both  regressions; a: Cut-off  point  in parentheses;  * Significant  at the 90% level;  * * significant
at 95% level.
One such determinant  likely to  be important is the technological  effort of firms.  The
survey questionnaire revealed that joint venture firms invested significantly more in training and
new technologies than pure "domestic" firms. It may be that the technological ability and effort
expended by many of the firms without foreign partners is too low to be able to absorb spillovers
when they occur, or that the firms with foreign linkages have absorbed a significant share of the
available  stock of labor with requisite  skills. Also, given that FDI and joint ventures together
account for significant shares of total assets, sales and employment in the Czech Republic, the
potential for positive  spillovers among firms with foreign partnerships, e.g. from  FDI firms to
19joint ventures, and among joint ventures, may be significant. It is suggestive that if "domestic"
firms  are excluded  from the  sample, FDI  has a positive  effect on  firms  with joint  ventures,
although this is not  statistically significant (the t-statistic is  1.42, possibly reflecting the small
sample size).
Finally, account should also be taken of the short time  frame on which the study has
focused. Spillovers may require more time before they show up in TFP growth rates. And, as
mentioned earlier, the absorption of new techniques requires significant in-house technological
effort which  may not  be  captured  adequately by the production function  methodology  used.
Clearly further research is required.
VI.  Concluding  Remarks
Firm-level data for the Czech Republic during 1992-96 suggest that foreign investment
has the predicted positive impact on the TFP growth of recipient firms. This result is robust to
corrections for the sample selection bias that prevails because foreign investment tends to go to
firms with above average initial productivity performance. This result is not  surprising, given
that there is a presumption that foreign investors should be transferring new technologies  and
knowledge to partner firms. With some lag, this is likely to be reflected in greater TFP growth.
FDI appears to have a greater impact on TFP growth than joint ventures, suggesting that parent
firms are transferring more know-how (soft or hard) to affiliates than joint venture firms obtain
from their partners.
Taken together, joint ventures and FDI appear to have a negative spillover effect on firms
in  each  industry  that  do  not  have  foreign partnerships.  This  effect  is  relatively  large  and
statistically significant. However, if the focus of attention is restricted to the impact of foreign-
20owned affiliates (FDI) on all other firms in an industry, the magnitude of the negative effect
becomes much smaller and loses statistical significance. This result, in conjunction with the fact
that taken together joint ventures and FDI account for significant shares of total output in many
industries, suggests that further research is required to determine the extent to which knowledge
diffuses  from  firms  with  strong  linkages  to  foreign  firms  to  those  that  do  not  have  such
relationships.  Of particular importance in this connection is to explore the extent of spillovers
among joint venture firms and between foreign affiliates and firms with joint ventures. Insofar as
joint  venture firms invest more in technology capacity (as suggested by their training efforts),
one expects these firms to be better able to  absorb and benefit from know-how diffusion.  The
absence  of  such capacity may be  a  factor underlying the observed  negative spillover  effect.
Longer times series and collection of data on variables that measure in-house technological effort
by firms would help to identify the magnitude and determinants of technological spillovers.
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